From Stephen Jay Gould’s iconic “panda’s thumb” argument, one might think the panda’s thumb fits better with evolutionary theory than it does with intelligent design.¹ In a recent peer-reviewed essay, and in two previous posts (here and here), I have argued that the thumb is not only compatible with intelligent design but actually supports it. Here I will reply to a possible objection.

The Objection Considered

Let us suppose that the panda’s thumb is suboptimal.² Granting this assumption, Gould’s argument is that a “clumsy” thumb counts as evidence in favor of evolution over divine design.³

Gould’s case hinges on different expectations or predictions of evolutionary theory and divine design, respectively. Given evolution, we’d expect a “clumsy” thumb. But given design, we would not. So a lousy thumb tilts the needle in favor of descent with modification.

In light of this formulation, several matters surface. For example, is a clumsy thumb compatible with intelligent design at all? In a previous post, I answered yes. But even so, a critic might grant that ID is compatible with the panda’s thumb, but still claim that the thumb generally fits better within an evolutionary paradigm rather than a design paradigm. The critic might also claim that many cases of suboptimality favor evolution over design. After all, evolution seems to predict suboptimality whereas design apparently does not. According to this critic, design might be able to accommodate the data, but it doesn’t predict the data. 

In my longer article, I explain that a likelihood formulation of the panda argument raises a similar point:

The point of the likelihood argument is to contrast special creation with evolution. That is, while an imperfect thumb is compatible with the activity of an omnipotent creator, nonetheless, it is said to be less expected on this view than on evolution. The deity tolerates a few screw-ups; evolution tolerates a lot. Thus, even if many people are not rationally obligated to accept the one-off claim that “God would probably not create or allow the suboptimal thumb,” the deeper point is to contrast evolution with special creation. The likelihood version holds that evolution fits the data better than creationism does. The point is to compare the two in light of the evidence; when that happens, evolution emerges as the victor.⁴

An Initial Reply

Well, just how much does evolution expect suboptimal structures? And just how much does intelligent design expect optimal ones? Some suboptimality is compatible with ID:

While ID theorists generally expect to find well-engineered systems or organisms in the natural world (Miller 2022), the theory is consistent with at least some degree of “devolution” in the present day (e.g., Minnich and Meyer 2004, pp. 301-2).⁵

Moreover, the expectations one might have of an intelligent agent are not per se the same as one might have of a divine being. Intelligent design “focuses on intelligent agency rather than the theology-rich concept of an ‘omnipotent creator.’” This again shapes expectations one ought to have given an ID view. 

At a deeper level, intelligent design theorists are free to hold additional claims that also legitimately shape their expectations of what a designer might have done in organic history. ID theorists in the Abrahamic traditions have particular resources in this regard. I explain one such possibility: 

For example, William Dembski holds that “[i]f humans are indeed the crown of Creation,” then “on theological grounds” it seems “entirely reasonable for human sin to have repercussions throughout the physical world” (Dembski 2009, p. 39). These repercussions include not just suboptimal designs but outright natural evil. In fact, Dembski accepts that God himself brought “about natural evil” in part to help human beings understand the seriousness of sin as well as their need for redemption (Dembski 2009, pp. 37, 150). On this view, one can reject the notion that God created only optimal designs in the biological realm. Similarly, one can accept that God knew about the Fall (logically) prior to the moment of creation and thus deliberately created suboptimal organisms for punitive and redemptive purposes.⁶

So, depending upon a given design theorist’s other beliefs, he or she might actually expect suboptimality. 

Moreover, ID theorists can also freely accept claims about the deity that shape how much humans can understand about suboptimality. On certain theological views, no intelligible explanation is available to explain (all) cases of suboptimality:

[A]dvocates of contemporary creationism, intelligent design, or related views can take matters one step further. Even aside from their own theories, there are independent (religious) reasons to think that suboptimal designs that have no purpose at all — not even salvific purposes — are fully compatible with the creative activity of an omnipotent creator. Philosopher Peter van Inwagen has argued that gratuitous evil poses no threat to God’s existence (van Inwagen 1995, 2006). Evil is “gratuitous” when it is unnecessary either for some compensating good or to prevent some worse (or equally bad) evil. If van Inwagen is correct, then an appendage that functions inefficiently and is not balanced by any compensating goods may be compatible with the claim that God created it. On this view, “gratuitous suboptimality,” as we may call it, is no objection to a creative deity.⁷

Once again, a person’s beliefs about God shape expectations about suboptimality. In Peter van Inwagen’s case, belief in God is completely compatible with the absence of any good reason for suboptimal organisms.

Even if evolution expects suboptimality more than ID does in general, the matter is complicated by the fact that a given individual may hold other beliefs about the designer that shape expectations about suboptimality. All things being equal, an ID theorist is free to hold that

God could have (i) created everything good but, for corrective and redemptive purposes, allowed the Fall to mar the biological realm, (ii) directly created suboptimal designs for divine purposes, or (iii) allowed suboptimal designs sans offsetting goods.⁸

Noting these possibilities does not mean that any of them are true or justified per se. Instead, the matter is much more complex than is generally acknowledged. Gould’s famous argument about the panda’s thumb turns out not to be so simple.

Deeper Still

The bigger point is that when it comes to claims about what God or a designer would or would not do, deep issues are close at hand. The relatively straightforward argument about the panda’s thumb is complicated by different conceptions of the Creator:

Just how much does the panda’s thumb favor evolution over its rival? … [T]he extent depends in part on what an omniscient creator would do. Religious traditions set the boundaries in different places. Even within each of the monotheistic religions, different sects have varied ideas about the matter. Unsurprisingly, these sects also often disagree about the quality and quantity of (expected) disarray in the created order.⁹

Some religious traditions do not expect much suboptimality. Others expect quite a lot. A version of the latter has been prominently defended by the Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga:

… Plantinga suggests that God may have allowed the incarnation, death, and resurrection of His Son as an unrivaled great-making property of the universe and as a remedy to the problem of creaturely rebellion. But “if the remedy is to be proportionate to the sickness . . . [our] world will contain a great deal of sin and a great deal of suffering and pain. Still further, it may very well contain sin and suffering, not just on the part of human beings but perhaps also on the part of other creatures as well” (Plantinga 2011, p. 59). Such sin and suffering may explain creaturely “predation, waste and pain” (Plantinga 2011, p. 59). On this view, we might be unsurprised to find manysuboptimal designs — perhaps even as many as we would expect given evolution. If so, then such imperfections do not favor evolution over creation.¹⁰

According to Plantinga, Christians ought to expect nature red tooth and claw. That’s what their worldview predicts. And this would shape their evaluation of the panda argument. In any case:

Whether Plantinga is correct or not is quite beside the point. Whether one is an atheist, agnostic, theist, or other, the deeper issue is that one’s conception of God (and perhaps related matters, like creaturely freedom) radically shapes the extent to which the panda’s thumb supports evolution over a given God-based view…. [T]he panda argument will have to engage serious theological issues in order to claim success. Perhaps this can be done, but the task is hardly trivial.¹¹

Hardly trivial indeed!

The Take-Away 

So, why point any of this out? For two main reasons:

First, expositions of the panda’s thumb argument rarely, if ever, acknowledge these matters, much less address them. Second, as noted, some prominent biologists make theology-laden arguments for evolution, yet likewise fail to do so with theological substance. Indeed, theology-laden defenses of current evolutionary theory in technical literature, popular writing, and textbooks nearly always lack theological and metaphysical rigor. In these contexts, the assertion that imperfection bolsters evolution over design-based rivals leaves much territory unexplored.¹²

Gould and others have too easily claimed that the suboptimality of the panda’s thumb counts as clear evidence in favor of evolution over its design rivals. But closer inspection reveals that such a claim requires a great deal more justification.¹³

Looking Ahead

If that weren’t enough, it turns out that the panda’s thumb argument actually raises significant problems for Gould and other evolutionists. The panda’s thumb is an adversary to evolution, not an ally. In two further posts I will show why that is the case.

Notes

1. Dilley, Stephen. 2023. “God, Gould, and the Panda’s Thumb.” Religions 14: 1006. https://doi.org/ 10.3390/rel14081006.
2. My first post in this series gives an argument to the contrary.
3. In what follows, I frame Gould’s argument as a likelihood argument rather than as deductive argument. See the discussion in Dilley, “God, Gould, and the Panda’s Thumb,” 7-10.
4. Dilley, “God, Gould, and the Panda’s Thumb,” p. 16, original emphasis.
5. Dilley, “God, Gould, and the Panda’s Thumb,” p. 14. Citations in the quote are to: Miller, Brian. 2022. “Engineering Principles Explain Biological Systems Better then Evolutionary Theory.” In Science and Faith in Dialogue. Edited by Frederik van Niekerk and Nico Vorster. Cape Town: AOSIS Publishing, pp. 175–212. Minnich, Scott, and Stephen Meyer. 2004. “Genetic analysis of coordinate flagellar and type III regulatory circuits in pathogenic bacteria.” In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Design & Nature, Rhodes, Greece. Edited by M. W. Collins and C. A. Brebbia. Southampton: Wessex Institute of Technology Press, pp. 295–304.
6. Dilley, “God, Gould, and the Panda’s Thumb,” p. 14, original emphasis. See also Dembski, William A. 2009. The End of Christianity. Nashville: B&H Academic.
7. Dilley, “God, Gould, and the Panda’s Thumb,” p. 14, original emphasis. See also: van Inwagen, Peter. 1995. God, Knowledge, and Mystery. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 11–124. van Inwagen, Peter. 2006. The Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Dilley, “God, Gould, and the Panda’s Thumb,” p. 14.
9. Dilley, “God, Gould, and the Panda’s Thumb,” p. 16, emphasis altered.
10. Dilley, “God, Gould, and the Panda’s Thumb,” p. 16, original emphasis. See also Plantinga, Alvin. 2011. Where the Conflict Really Lies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
11. Dilley, “God, Gould, and the Panda’s Thumb,” p. 16.
12. Dilley, “God, Gould, and the Panda’s Thumb,” p. 16.
13. For further discussion and additional complexities, see Dilley, “God, Gould, and the Panda’s Thumb,” p. 17, including endnotes 32 and 33.