Two new law review articles were recently published in Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion discussing the teaching of evolution. Asma T. Uddin authored an article entitled, “Evolution Disclaimers, Establishment Jurisprudence Confusions, and a Proposal of Untainted Fruits of a Poisonous Tree,” which aimed to “determine the constitutionality of disclaimers” regarding the teaching of evolution. The second article, “Evolution and the Holy Ghost of Scopes: Can Science Lose the Next Round,” by New York Law School professor Stephen A. Newman, provides a shimmering example of how mainstream academics support blatant censorship of the pro-intelligent design viewpoint. A series of two posts will discuss these articles.

Disclaiming Disclaimers
I’ve discussed recently why think textbook disclaimers are not an effective way to improve evolution education. My high school English teacher would always teach that if you want convey a message, you have to “show” it, not simply “tell” it. Disclaimers try to tell students something while failing to engage them with the scientific evidence–they are poor teaching tools, if they can even be called “teaching tools.” Nonetheless, while I agree with some case law that has struck down disclaimers on constitutional grounds (such as the Freiler ruling), I think that disclaimers get an undeserved bad rap. I oppose them on education policy grounds. Quite frankly, I don’t understand why disclaimers are so popular: they don’t do much to improve classroom learning.

Asma T. Uddin believes that many evolution disclaimers are unconstitutional but wants to provide constructive help. She takes a novel approach by suggesting that “striking down the disclaimers without providing alternative responses to the legitimate free exercise concerns involved may violate the Free Exercise Clause.” Implicit in this argument, however, is the premise that evolution disclaimers are simply about religion. Uddin writes: “As a way of negotiating free exercise and establishment concerns, this article proposes a generalized disclaimer; one that does not single out evolutionary theory for special treatment, but rather addresses scientific inquiry as a whole.” Uddin’s main concern regarding disclaimers is how they may single out of evolution for special treatment:

Permissible objectives can include increasing awareness of the nature of the scientific enterprise and sources of knowledge; generalized disclaimers that present this information can help students think critically about science and inquiry–including evolutionary theory–without singling out evolution for special treatment.

(Asma T. Uddin, “Evolution Disclaimers, Establishment Jurisprudence Confusions, and a Proposal of Untainted Fruits of a Poisonous Tree,” 8.2 Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion (Spring, 2007).)

Such efforts might be commendable, but Uddin seems to forget that a variety of courts have rejected the “singling out” evolution argument. In the now-vacated Selman v. Cobb County ruling, Judge Cooper actually found that it was not illegitimate for the school district to “single out” evolution:

The School Board members convincingly testified at trial that they believed all scientific theories should be critically considered, and they also stated that they singled out evolution because it was the topic causing the controversy at the time. The Court finds the School Board’s explanation to be rational and does not declare the Sticker to violate the purpose prong of Lemon. (Selman v. Cobb County Board of Education, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1309 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (emphases added))

Similarly, in the Freiler case the Fifth Circuit also found that it is not inappropriate to single out evolution, even if there are religious concerns in the mix. The court noted that “a purpose is no less secular simply because it is infused with a religious element” and “the fact that evolution, the subject about which the School Board sought to disclaim any orthodoxy of belief, is religiously charged … and the fact that sensitivities and sensibilities to which the School Board sought to reduce offense are religious in nature, does not per se establish that those avowed purposes are religious purposes.” (Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education, 185 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 1999).) The court explicitly validated those purposes because “local school boards need not turn a blind eye to the concerns of students and parents troubled by the teaching of evolution in public classrooms.” (Id. at 346.)

While generalized disclaimers about the nature of science would most certainly not harm education, scholars should not forget that there are many legitimate secular reasons why evolution, in and of itself, may warrant special treatment: Neo-Darwinian Evolution is highly controversial (both socially and scientifically) and there is a significant body of scientific dissent from the Neo-Darwinian paradigm. Uddin offers some innovative ideas, and she clearly aims to be a constructive critic. But the underlying assumption motivating her article — that evolution cannot be legitimately singled out for special treatment — is false. Darwinists have repeated the “singling out” rhetoric for years. By making the “singling out” argument, it is the Darwinists who single out evolution as the only scientific theory which is apparently beyond scientific critique in schools.