Is mainstream evolutionary theory compatible with a biology-based argument for intelligent design? University of Helsinki theologian Rope Kojonen believes that it is. He has written a serious and thoughtful book on the subject, The Compatibility of Evolution and Design (CED). In fact, Kojonen argues that evolution (and biology) rightly understood actually point to design. So, in this sense, evolution is supportive of the design argument. Is he right?

Casey Luskin, Brian Miller, Emily Reeves, and I recently published a peer-reviewed article that analyzes Kojonen’s proposal in CED. In a series here we are reviewing the subject further. While we were impressed by the nuance and erudition of the book, Kojonen’s model does not succeed. Even though he offers a “philosophical” model, it rises or falls in part on scientific evidence, whatever that evidence happens to be.

The Challenge

Here are Kojonen’s two main tenets in CED:

1. Evolutionary theory, properly understood, is compatible with a certain type of biological design argument. 
2. The biological world itself provides notable grounds for belief in a purposeful Creator, and evolutionary theory does not defeat these grounds. 

The bulk of CED articulates and defends these two claims. This is no small matter. Evolutionary explanations purport to explain the very same features that biological design arguments focus on. Why invoke design to explain the eye of an eagle, say, if natural selection, random mutation, and other natural processes already explain it? Ockham’s razor would seem to shave away design. Thus, Kojonen’s task is not simply to show that “design” and “evolution” are compatible in some general sense, but also to show that the biological world provides a robust case for design that is not rendered superfluous by evolutionary explanations. This means, in effect, that he must show that “design and evolution” together provide a better explanation of biological complexity than simply “evolution” on its own. If he can’t do that, then he will not have overcome the alleged superfluity of design. That is, if “design” doesn’t add any explanatory value to “evolution,” then it’s unnecessary to include design at all. In that case, there’s no reason to go beyond the sufficiency of evolutionary theory on its own.

So, how does Kojonen show that “design and evolution” is superior as an explanation to “evolution” by itself? 

As we explain in our article:

In chapter four, Kojonen marshals various arguments to show that the preconditions of evolution must be designed if evolution is to be successful (as he believes it to be). The deck must be stacked in advance. In particular, fitness landscapes must be finely tuned ahead of time in order for evolutionary processes to successfully produce biological complexity and diversity. Kojonen believes that it is implausible to think that evolutionary processes can account for flora and fauna without these special preconditions. To make his case, Kojonen cites the work of Andreas Wagner, William Dembski, and others on protein evolution, evolutionary algorithms, structuralism, and the like. For Kojonen, these thinkers’ arguments powerfully show that evolutionary processes need prior “fine-tuning” of fitness landscapes (Kojonen 2021, pp. 97–143, esp. pp. 109–23). Thus, ‘evolution and design’ is superior to ‘evolution alone’.

So, Kojonen argues that evolution needs design in the form of fine-tuned “preconditions” in order to account for biological complexity. Thus, “design” adds something significant to “evolution.”

Our basic response:

Though we do not have space to examine every line of evidence that Kojonen raises, we… analyze three key areas: fitness landscapes, the bacterial flagellum, and convergence. With respect to these areas, Kojonen must accomplish the following: First, he must justify his empirical claim about fitness landscapes. Without smooth landscapes, his concept of ‘design’ cannot augment ‘evolution’ in a way that helps explain evolution’s ability to search and find viable biological forms. ‘Design’ would thus add little explanatory value on this score. Second, Kojonen must show that the bacterial flagellum counts as evidence for ‘design’ but in a way that does not conflict with ‘evolution’. If the flagellum manifests a type of design inconsistent with evolution, then, in effect, Kojonen would have accepted evidence that creates an internal tension in his conjunction of ‘design and evolution’. Third, Kojonen must similarly show how convergence supports his view of ‘design’ in a way that also avoids conflict with ‘evolution’. Thus, in sum, Kojonen needs to articulate and justify his conception of design in a way that augments the explanatory value of evolution rather than undercuts it.

Two Tasks for Kojonen

Thus, Kojonen must do two things: First, he needs to show that there is good empirical evidence of design. If there is no such evidence, then it’s hard to see how design adds much of value. A design hypothesis without empirical evidence is a bit like David Spade without Chris Farley — there really isn’t much there to care about. 

Second, Kojonen must show that design (as he envisions it) does not conflict with mainstream evolutionary theory. If Kojonen’s conception of design is incompatible with evolution, then his conjunction of “design and evolution” has a problem: one half of the duo would be contrary to the other half. This is akin to sawing off the branch upon which one sits. Such a view would lose the whole point of The Compatibility of Evolution and Design.

With these two tasks in mind, the reader has a handy way to evaluate Kojonen’s model. Does he provide good empirical evidence of his conception of design? And does this conception conflict with evolutionary theory?

With regard to the second question, consider the bacterial flagellum and convergent evolution. In Kojonen’s model, these two count as indications of, or support for, “design” (as he sees it) but they also conflict in some way with “evolution.” Thus, we argue that this creates internal tension in Kojonen’s conjunction of “design and evolution.”

And then there is the first question, which focuses on the evidential basis for Kojonen’s version of design. We think that his model implies the existence of fine-tuned preconditions (especially in the form of smooth fitness landscapes). On his model, this is precisely where “design” adds explanatory value to “evolution” — evolution cannot explain biological complexity without design. Is there good evidence of fine-tuned preconditions? Are fitness landscapes smooth? Put differently, is there a strong evidential basis for the claim that such preconditions and landscapes exist? 

This is a question that can be examined empirically. Hence, our article focuses quite a lot on protein isolation, fitness landscapes, and so on. We think that there are strong empirical reasons to think that smooth fitness landscapes and fine-tuned preconditions as Kojonen envisions them do not exist. The point for now is that, if our empirical analysis is correct, then it’s difficult to see how Kojonen’s conception of “design” adds explanatory value to “evolution.” If the “design” in question runs counter to the actual data, it does not have a strong evidential basis. Accordingly, it’s very difficult to see how “design and evolution” are explanatorily superior to “evolution” on its own. We regard this as a fundamental problem with Kojonen’s model.

The Importance of Scientific Evidence

Why make such a big deal of all of this? As we explain about Kojonen’s evolution-friendly biological design argument (or KEBDA):

[I]n the face of scientific criticisms of Kojonen’s model, proponents of Kojonen’s view may be tempted to defend it in the following ways: 

• Kojonen’s proposal is a philosophical model, not a scientific one. Scientific evidence is of secondary importance. 
• KEBDA is primarily an exercise in harmonizing two distinct views (“design” and “evolution”), not in the evaluation of the empirical evidence for these views, whether individually or jointly. 
• Kojonen’s model shows that evolution and design are compatible, whatever the scientific details may be. Having established this harmony, it is now just a matter of working out the details over time. 

But we reply:

It is true that KEBDA is a philosophical argument. And, of course, the conceptual and epistemological elements of the argument are important. But some philosophical arguments also depend in part upon scientific evidence. In this case, much depends on whether there is a good case for fine-tuned preconditions and suitable fitness landscapes (as Kojonen envisions them). Indeed, Kojonen situates design precisely in those fine-tuned preconditions which yield smooth fitness landscapes that allow evolution to succeed. His case for marrying design with evolution therefore depends on the existence of this fine-tuning. So, it is crucial to assess whether this fine-tuning is real. And this question can be assessed scientifically: are fitness landscapes smooth? Are there open pathways between functional proteins, for example? Or are there impassible barriers between such proteins? 

Scientific data are also crucial to assessing the internal harmony of Kojonen’s conjunction of ‘design and evolution’. For example, do empirical studies show that the bacterial flagellum embodies a type of design that is in tension with Kojonen’s acceptance of evolution or not?

Thus, a key way to assess Kojonen’s model is to analyze whether scientific evidence supports his conception of design and its alleged harmony with evolution. If there’s no good empirical evidence of design (as he conceptualizes it), then his model fails. Likewise, if there is good evidence of design, but the type of design in question is incompatible with evolutionary theory, then his model will also have failed.